Hardball
Accusations that the Globe croaked the Monitor Channel recall a previous
media war. Plus, blood, guts, and TV news; and Pedro, sí,
español, no.
There's something Paula Jones-like about Alex Beam's Boston Globe column
of last Friday. The Divine Miss J claims she's suing Bill Clinton to save her
reputation, conveniently overlooking the fact that no one had ever heard of her
before she went public. Likewise, Beam denies he was part of a Globe
effort to put the Christian Science Church's cable-TV venture out of business
-- thus giving widespread play to an accusation found only in the footnotes of
a forthcoming book that is, to be kind, unlikely to crack the bestseller
lists.
To be sure, former Monitor Channel employee Susan Bridge, in Monitoring the
News: The Brilliant Launch and Sudden Collapse of the Monitor Channel (M.E.
Sharpe), fails to make a credible case against the Globe. Bridge argues
-- minus any evidence -- that the Globe pounded the fractious Christian
Science Church and its troubled media operations not just because it was a
great story, but because the Globe was desperate to prevent a proposed
merger between the Providence Journal Company and the Monitor Channel. Such a
move, she notes, would have given the Journal Company entrée into the
Greater Boston cable market, something she speculates the Globe was
determined to prevent. The merger was never consummated, which Bridge claims
led directly to the Monitor Channel's demise in 1992, just 13 months after its
debut.
Bridge's conspiracy theory (a catch phrase she loathes, but it fits) is free
of inconvenient denials: she didn't even bother to interview officials at the
Globe. "It's a black box," she says by way of explanation. "I don't know
about decision-making at the Globe. What [the Globe did to] hurt
the Monitor Channel is on the public record."
Responds business-page columnist Joan Vennochi, identified by Bridge (also in
the footnotes) as one of Beam's fellow conspirators: "I just think it's
ridiculous."
Yet there's something tantalizing about Bridge's theory. Wrong though she may
be, the hardball scenario she describes -- zealous coverage of a competitor
aimed at putting it out of business -- is one that is largely responsible for
the Globe's emergence as New England's dominant media force.
The story begins back in the 1950s, when the Globe and the Boston
Herald were engaged in a tense struggle for primacy. Herald
publisher Robert "Beanie" Choate was determined to acquire Channel 5, and he
frequently taunted Globe publisher Davis Taylor, saying once he
succeeded, he would use his television revenues to put the Globe out of
business.
As recounted in the late J. Anthony Lukas's Common Ground (1986),
Choate got the opportunity he'd been looking for in 1957, when Joseph Kennedy
Sr. was lobbying for a Pulitzer Prize for his son John F. Kennedy's
Profiles in Courage (which, according to other accounts, may or may not
have actually been written by JFK). The Pulitzer judges hadn't even named
Profiles a finalist, but that didn't stop Joe Kennedy from going to work
on the Pulitzer advisory committee, which had the final say.
Among the committee's members was Choate, who was reportedly offered
assistance by Kennedy bag-carrier Francis Xavier Morrissey in circumventing the
Federal Communications Commission's cross-ownership prohibitions. And sure
enough, several weeks after Jack Kennedy was awarded a Pulitzer, the FCC gave
the Channel 5 license to Choate.
Enter Bob Healy, a young political reporter and the son of a Globe
mailroom employee who had been befriended by the Taylor family. Healy was
dispatched to Washington to cover politics -- and, as Lukas puts it, to serve
as the Taylors' "special envoy on Channel 5." Healy pursued his quarry with
enthusiasm. He whacked out the lightly qualified Morrissey when JFK and, later,
Lyndon Johnson tried to nominate him for a federal judgeship, thus winning the
Globe its first Pulitzer. He chased rumors that a Herald
stockholder had mob ties. Most important to the task at hand, he obtained
telephone-company records that documented improper contacts between Choate and
the chairman of the FCC.
Healy's work finally paid off in 1972, when the FCC reversed its earlier vote
and awarded Channel 5 to a community group. The Herald Traveler, as the
paper was then known, couldn't sustain itself, and it fell into the hands of
the Hearst Corporation, which merged it with its Record American and
renamed its paper the Herald American. The Hearst paper staggered on
until 1981, when Australian press baron Rupert Murdoch rescued it just days
before it would have gone under. (Ironically, Hearst now owns Channel 5.)
Healy's reward was a long stint as the Globe's executive editor.
Without question, last Friday afternoon's live suicide on a Los Angeles
freeway represented local TV news at its worst. With a distraught protester
holding up traffic for miles around, the choppers moved in. Some stations even
interrupted children's programming, evidently believing the kiddies would like
real violence even better than the animated kind. And they kept rolling as the
man lit himself on fire, then shot himself in the head.
This landmark moment in the devolution of media came, perversely, just a day
after the FCC rejected a test challenge that had been brought by Rocky Mountain
Media Watch. The left-leaning group, based in Denver, had argued that four
Denver stations should lose their licenses because their news operations
focused excessively on violence, racial and gender stereotypes, and trivia. Had
Rocky Mountain won, it would have paved the way for similar license challenges
nationally.
The FCC rejected Rocky Mountain's case on First Amendment grounds, ruling that
TV stations "are entitled to the widest latitude of journalistic discretion in
this regard." It was the correct decision. Rocky Mountain's motives may be
pure, but what is the difference between its challenge and, say, a
religious-right group's going after a station for running pro-choice
editorials?
Still, the LA incident demonstrates Rocky Mountain's central point. Corporate
greed has transformed televised free speech into an all-out pursuit of ratings
and profit -- the public interest be damned.
Granted, it would be a bit much to insist that the Boston Globe publish
a complete Spanish-language edition every day. But its decision to run a
Spanish-language story each day after Pedro Martinez pitches at Fenway makes
some condescending assumptions about what interests Latinos: Pedro,
sí; real news, and even other sports news, no.
There's something smugly offensive about the Globe's belief that
non-English-speaking Latinos will fork over 50 cents (or $2 if Martinez pitches
at home on a Saturday) for one story. It's pandering, and cheapskate pandering
at that: Martinez's road performances, of course, will be chronicled in English
only.
Articles from July 24, 1997 & before can be accessed here