Speaking from Paris, Yves Boyer thinks the problem is larger than a simple dispute between France and the US over Iraq policy. Rather, he sees the jousting as part of a broader, more significant battle over approaches to emerging global dangers. He also believes a greater array of groups beyond those nations maligned by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as "Old Europe" oppose American strategies on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

"On many issues concerning the state of world affairs — the environment, aid to the poorest nations," observes Boyer, "there is a gap." In particular, the rhetoric of the "war on terror" is a bête noire for Boyer. "It is naive to portray the current problem as a ‘war on terrorism,’" he insists. "What does that mean? Certainly, we have to control [terrorists]. We have to have cooperation on intelligence. But there is no willingness in the US to address the political problems at the root of terrorism."

In the May 21 Brookings press briefing, Daalder floated an even simpler foundation for the Franco-American dust-up: the personal world-view of George W. Bush. Daalder told the assembled audience:

One thing one often forgets about George W. Bush is that his foreign policy is very personality-driven. It is not just about American power and American interests; it is also and most importantly about the people that are part of the relationship. George Bush’s fight is with Osama bin Laden, remember? Dead or alive. It is with Saddam Hussein, that evil dictator. It is with Kim Jong Il, somebody whom he said he loathed.... It is a highly personal fight and so are his friendships. Tony Blair is a friend. The crown prince of Saudi Arabia is a friend. President Musharraf of Pakistan is a friend. In fact, Mr. Putin, the president of Russia, is a friend. There are a host of other "friends" that Mr. Bush, when they are true friends, invites to the ranch. And when you don’t get invited to the ranch, you, obviously, Mr. Chirac, are not a friend.

In short, if you want to understand how Bush looks and relates to other leaders in the world and particularly European leaders, you have to look at what I call his loyalty meter. He has a sense of who is loyal to him in a personal perspective, as well as to the United States with regard to policies, and Iraq triggers this loyalty meter in a very, very important way.

Daalder also underscored Bush’s use of the presidency as an international bully pulpit. "He clearly wanted to show Gerhard Schröder after September [elections in Germany], and he now wants to show Jacques Chirac, that there is a price to pay for defying the United States in the way that they did." But having said that, Daalder emphasized the ways personal admiration and antipathy motivate the American president. "[T]here’s also something visceral," he said of Bush. "This is a man who deeply values his personal relationship with leaders. Most leaders in fact value their personal relationship with [other] leaders, but he has a sense [that] a country’s loyalty, a country’s place in American foreign policy, is to some extent dependent upon how the relationship is between George Bush and the particular leader in question."

AMONG THE DANGERS of relying so heavily on personal pique and paternal largesse in international affairs is that administrations eventually end — yet policy and history march on. The stakes of George Bush’s affective relationships with world leaders for the future of US-EU relations — and even the success of the EU itself — are high indeed. In the case of the US-Europe relationship, there is a strong feeling among analysts of all stripes that the US position on the continuing integration of the European Union is changing — and may already have changed. A new step toward European integration was taken on Monday, with the publication of a long-awaited draft constitution for the EU that calls for an elected president and a commitment to a common foreign policy to match the EU’s common currency — the euro.

Yet the United States’ willingness to differentiate between "Old Europe" and "New Europe" and its success in dividing European foreign policy may signal a radical shift in US policy toward the EU. Daalder gave prominence to this new line of thinking in his May 21 remarks:

For 50 years, it has been the policy of this country to support unquestionably the integration and unification of Europe. There have in fact been times when the Americans were more pro-European than the Europeans.... All of you will recall that Mr. Rumsfeld during the run-up to the Iraq war started to make a big deal of Old Europe and New Europe. The fact that there were some countries in Europe that we could trust, that were allies that we could hang our hat on, and there were other allies we could in fact ignore.... The United States is willing to put the knife in that wound and start shifting back and forth a little bit in order to make it bleed a little more in order for Europe to start falling apart even more so that in fact you can pick and choose your allies when it is necessary, when the demand of the moment requires it, so that you can forge your coalition of the willing by cherry-picking.

Boyer agrees with Daalder’s analysis. "There is a tendency on the part of the Bush administration to play one European nation against another," he says, "in an effort to disaggregate Europe." Though there are political underpinnings for this new US tactic, Boyer also chalks up the new American attitude to "the emergence of the EU as a competitor" in the trade and political spheres. "There is a growing sense of friction because of this emergence," he says.

For his part, Hulsman argues that such rethinking among US policymakers is not only justified, but necessary. "I think it’s long overdue," he says. "Some members of the EU, if you read their newspapers, are intent on creating a new political and economic rationale for union. They want to create a pole of power to challenge the US. So the US is right to be more agnostic [about the EU]."

Concern about the shift in American policy toward the EU surfaces regularly now. Boyer directed my attention to a May 7 speech given to the New York–based Foreign Policy Association by Javier Solana — former secretary general of NATO and now the EU high representative for common foreign and security policy:

The European Union is more than the sum of its parts. Therefore, I am concerned when I hear, for the first time, influential voices asking whether the United States would be better served by disaggregating Europe. Such an approach would not only contradict generations of American wisdom, it would also be profoundly misguided. I am, however, comforted that the voice with the greatest authority in the United States does not share these views. For it was President Bush who said in Berlin: "When Europe grows in unity, Europe and America grow in security.

Of course, President Bush stressed European unity a little over a year ago, in a May 23, 2002, speech to Germany’s parliament. That was before the spat over Iraq tore the relationship asunder.

And American rhetoric is sharpening. Take Bush’s most recent remarks on the EU’s trade policy. In a May 22 speech, Bush accused the EU of exacerbating starvation in Africa by opposing genetically modified foods. "European governments should join — not hinder — the great cause of ending hunger in Africa," Bush declared.

Boyer argues that such comments are "something that really antagonizes Europe." He predicts that though the Evian summit will amass a group of world leaders "who will have a pleasant face, and give the impression that they are in control," a deeper and darker undercurrent will infuse the proceedings. "Many people in Europe are beginning to be fed up with an approach in which they are rewarded and punished," Boyer says. "It could be the beginning of an emotional rejection of Bush."

Hulsman thinks Bush could be tempted to stay on the attack — and use the summit to play to the 70 percent of US citizens polled as being anti-French. The president might also be baited by what Hulsman predicts will be a "sound-bite moment" in which "President Chirac lectures President Bush, mainly for [French] domestic consumption."

But Hulsman hopes Bush will hold his fire — because he’s already won. "What the president needs to do is to resist the temptation to lecture back," says Hulsman, "and ignore the chance to score cheap political points. He needs to say: ‘We’re not the ones dividing Europe. We’ll leave that to President Chirac when he deals with Eastern Europe. Iraq proved that there’s no common EU position. We can find seven, eight, or nine allies when we need them.’"

For the US, it appears that the immediate question is how much friction with Europe it is willing to create to pursue its unilateralist foreign policy. For Europe, the stakes appear to be much higher — perhaps, the entire future of its experiment in political unity.

Richard Byrne can be reached at richardbyrne1@starpower.net